



R5.2.1 Second Annual Cybersecurity Skills Trends Report



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Abbreviation	Explanation/ Definition
ACSC	Australian Cyber Security Centre
CISO	Chief Information Security Officer
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DoS	Denial of Service
ENISA	The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity
EU	The European Union
ECSF	European Cyber Security Framework
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
IoT	Internet of Things
MITM	Man-in-the-Middle
NCSC	National Cyber Security Centre (New Zealand)
PhaaS	Phishing-as-a-Service
RaaS	Ransomware as a Service
RDoS	Ransom Denial of Service
RFID	Radio-frequency identification

Table 1. List of abbreviations and acronyms





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REWIRE Annual Cybersecurity Skills Trends Report

SUMMARY

This deliverable is an integral component of an overarching aim of REWIRE to monitor, report, and evaluate the state of cybersecurity skills within the EU, offering a yearly snapshot of the identified cybersecurity skills gaps. Its scope is comprehensive, aimed at illuminating the landscape of cybersecurity expertise – from the trends in the cybersecurity workforce to the emergence of new skill sets. The report seeks to provide a better understanding of overall situation in cybersecurity skills market. It is positioned to serve as a critical resource for stakeholders at various levels providing them with the intelligence needed to make informed decisions and strategic adjustments.

The analysis of the skills market is a cornerstone of this report. It is not merely an assessment of the current availability of skills but a prognostic tool that highlights where the sector falls short and where it must evolve. Moreover, the report offers a detailed examination of the prevailing cybersecurity threat trends that have been observed over the past year. This examination is not conducted in isolation; it correlates these trends with workforce competencies, thereby providing a clearer picture of how the skills available in the market align with the threats encountered.

In essence, this deliverable serves as a strategic tool, a call to action, and a beacon for future readiness. It underscores the importance of adaptive education, proactive policy-making, and strategic workforce development to ensure that the cybersecurity sector remains robust, agile, and capable of withstanding the everevolving threats that it faces.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In an environment where cybersecurity dynamics are in constant flux, a structured approach to tracking and analyzing trends is crucial. The 2nd Annual Cybersecurity Skills Trends Report, crafted by the Erasmus+ REWIRE project, represents a concerted effort to systematically gather data on the shifting landscape of cybersecurity competencies. The aim is to identify and anticipate future needs in the cybersecurity skill sector, laying a foundation for the development of subsequent project deliverables.

The structure of the Report is meticulously organized into several key sections:

Section 2 outlines the methodology employed by REWIRE to track and analyze trends in cybersecurity skills. This methodological framework is critical for ensuring that the data collected is robust and that the analysis is grounded in a repeatable, scientific approach.

Section 3 offers an in-depth examination of the current cybersecurity skills demand landscape. It meticulously articulates the findings and insights gleaned from the Cybersecurity Job Ads Analyzer and the stakeholder survey, both of which are instrumental in pinpointing existing skills gaps and assessing the state of cybersecurity competencies across the industry.

Section 4 offers an analysis of cybersecurity threat trends. By understanding the trajectory of threats, one can infer the direction in which cybersecurity skills need to evolve to counteract these threats effectively.

Finally, Section 5 encapsulates the essence of the report by merging the identified cybersecurity threats with the requisite skills necessary for their mitigation. This synthesis informs curriculum development, training programs, and policy-making. It ensures that educational institutions, training providers, and policymakers are in lockstep with the practical needs of the cybersecurity realm, equipping professionals with the tools and knowledge to safeguard digital assets in an increasingly complex and vulnerable cyber landscape.

This report builds on the foundation laid by the initial report delivered in October 2022 and will be further expanded in the forthcoming report in October 2024. By maintaining a pulse on the sector's progression, the REWIRE project ensures that its outputs remain relevant and that stakeholders are equipped with the knowledge to make informed decisions in the rapidly evolving cybersecurity domain.



2. METHODOLOGY

To construct this report, the project team used diverse information sources. The list in Table 2 depicts the information sources used or planned to be used in the future to support the creation of this report and its iterations.

Information source	Description	Status and Periodicity
Stakeholders' survey	The Survey conducted to collect in- formation about unfilled cybersecu- rity job positions, the most sought- after skills and the ability of educa- tion providers to train the needed professionals	In progress – will be pro- vided in the third report First results in 2021 – re- ported in R2.2.2. Cyberse- curity Skills Needs Analysis and in 1 st Annual Cyberse- curity Skills Trends Report within R5.2.1 Repeated every two years
Job Ads Analysis	This tool created by REWIRE team allows identifying, which cyberse- curity skills are required within an ad and creates appropriate map- pings to the relevant cybersecurity roles	Implemented (2023) (First results in 2022) Repeated annually
National, regional, Eu- ropean and industry risk and threat reports	Cybersecurity risk and threats reports of various actors (e.g., ENISA), governmental reports (UK, New Zealand, Australia, etc.) and similar are reviewed to provide insights on the subjects of cybersecurity skills.	Implemented (2023) Repeated annually
Sectoral surveys and studies	Sectoral surveys and studies from various organizations (e.g., CrowdStrike, Sophos, Truesec, etc.) are reviewed in order to provide further insights on the subjects of cybersecurity skills	Implemented (2023) Repeated annually
The CyberABILITY plat- form	The CyberABILITY platform will combine information and present information to interested parties on the 12 roles of the ECSF,	In progress – will be pro- vided in the third report4

Information source	Description	Status and Periodicity
	professional courses, academic de- grees and certifications.	

Table 2. Skills Trend Report information sources

The initial methodological approach included two steps. First, a Stakeholders' survey to be conducted in order to identify the most coveted skills and the capacity of educational institutions to educate the required professionals. Second, results of Job Ads Analysis that enabled the recognition of certain skills necessitated in respective ads and established corresponding links to the pertinent roles in cybersecurity. Due to limited possibilities to gather reasonable responses from the stakeholders (e.g.: privacy issues, absence of EU level recognised skills framework, time constrains, complexity of the issue, etc.) it was decided to include the results of the stakeholders survey in the third report and instead supplement this methodological step with extensive review of different secondary sources that reflect the skills related issues in cybersecurity for this report. Comparative analysis of different sectoral surveys and studies as well as the national threats trends reports is conducted in this report to identify the latest cybersecurity threats trends which emerged over the last year. It then allows the analysis of the respective skills required to tackle the emerging threats. For each skills trend report, the information derived from all these sources and any new identified at that time will be combined to produce the relevant insights. The following Section 3 provides more information on the implementation of the methodology.

In the expert evaluation of this report, it was noted that "the evolution in the education landscape makes the findings of previous projects obsolete. While the methodologies proposed in those projects are still relevant, their conclusions should be left in favour of the analysis of the current scenario. This is one of the weak points of the version of R.5.2.1 released in March 2023. The version of the same report released in December 2023 does not reference the results of old projects, but in the tentative of making the document aligned with current threats, it missed the original methodological framework." In response to these observations, the starting point for the First Annual Cybersecurity Trends Report was the study of the information, deliverables, and activities of the pilot projects to gain their perspective on emerging cybersecurity skills. As intended, since the pilot projects' results were already presented, they were not included in the Second Annual Cybersecurity Trends Report. Thus, it should be emphasized that the methodology has been intentionally changed and should not be considered a methodological drawback.

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3. STATUS OF CYBERSECURITY SKILLS AND SYSTEMATIC SKILL GAPS: JOB ADS ANALYSIS

In the second annual report the REWIRE partners embark the following approach to elucidate the landscape of the cybersecurity skills shortage, mainly the **Development of the Cybersecurity Job Ads Analyzer.** This innovative application is designed as a tool to aggregate and examine job adverts. It incorporates a machine learning algorithm, which is instrumental in pinpointing and delineating the specific competencies sought in an advertised open cybersecurity job market. The analysers' sophisticated capabilities enable a granular analysis of the evolving demands of cybersecurity skills, thus providing invaluable insights into the current skills ecosystem. The insights developed via Job Ads Analysis will be integrated within the CyberABILITY platform presenting the fuller picture of the skills required to respond to certain threats.

The subsequent section will offer a description of this measure, outlining the methodology employed, the data gathered, and the analytical frameworks applied. The findings and implications drawn from both the Cybersecurity Job Ads Analyzer is pivotal, not just for understanding the current state of cybersecurity skills requirements, but also for shaping future strategies to bridge the gap effectively.

Taking as a starting point the work performed as part of the R.2.2.3. *Methodology to anticipate future needs* and R2.2.2 *Cybersecurity Skills Needs Analysis*, the REWIRE project has developed and further evolved a dynamic web application called *Cybersecurity Job Ads Analyzerⁱ*. This tool allows identifying which cybersecurity skills are required in a work role.

The Cybersecurity Job Ads Analyzer is not merely a standalone application but a key component of the greater REWIRE R5.1 CyberABILITY platform.

The following diagram (see Figure 1) depicts the main components and characteristics of the Job Ads Analyzer tool:



Figure 1. Process diagram of the Job Ads Analyser tool

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The tool has four main views: 1) the database, 2) the "Create Your Ad" tab, 3) the "Statistics" tab, and 4) the Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. The Job Ads Analyzer allows users to add job adverts. Filters can be applied based on various parameters such as the country of the job posting, the year it was posted, allowing for a tailored search experience. The ML algorithm permits analysing a selection of ads depending on the chosen filtering. For instance, a user can select all the ads related to the ENISA Cybersecurity Architect profile, process them through the ML algorithm, and obtain which skills are the most needed for this profile.

The Job Ads Analyzer has revealed a compelling set of data that reflects the contemporary landscape of the cybersecurity job market. The top 10 skills, according to its findings, illustrate a blend of soft skills, technical expertise, and strategic acumen that are in high demand across the industry.

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Rank	Skill	Occurrence
1	Collaborate and Communicate	85.28 %
2	Information Systems and Network Security	67.41 %
3	Information Security Controls Assessment	65.05 %
4	Business Continuity	50.2 %
5	Risk Management	49.41 %
6	Threat Analysis	48.75 %
7	Organizational Awareness	48.62 %
8	Incident Management	46.65 %
9	Data Security	45.07 %
10	Enterprise Architecture and Infrastructure Design	44.55 %





At the moment of the submission of this deliverable, the Job Ads Analyzer counted 927 inserted jobs. Specifically, the ads were categorized based on ENISA profiles (see Table 3).

ENISA profile	Number of Ads
Chief Information Security Officer	99
Cybersecurity Architect	142

Cybersecurity Auditor	75
Cybersecurity Educator	18
Cybersecurity Implementer	148
Cyber Incident Responder	115
Cyber Legal, Policy & Compliance Officer	53
Cybersecurity Researcher	44
Cybersecurity Risk Manager	76
Cyber Threat Intelligence Specialist	57
Digital Forensics Investigator	22
Penetration Tester	69

Table 3. Number of Ads

It is important to note that each ad can be linked to more ENISA profiles. The above table shows the connection to the main identified profile.

For the REWIRE project, particular attention is given to several specialized roles—Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), Cyber Threat Intelligence Specialist, Cyber Incident Responder, and Penetration Tester. These roles are earmarked for deeper analysis in terms of developing dedicated trainings and certification schemes, recognizing their pivotal position within the cybersecurity ecosystem. The selection of these profiles for the REWIRE project is grounded in criteria, detailed in the R4.2.1 *REWIRE Curricula and Training Framework* and other documented sourcesⁱⁱ.

For the CISO, the identified skills with the respective occurrences are shown in Table 4.

Rank	Skill	Occurrence
1	Collaborate and Communicate	56 %
2	Threat Analysis	46 %
3	Data Security	41 %
4	Information Systems and Network Security	31 %
5	Risk Management	24 %
6	Testing and Evaluation	19 %
7	Operating Systems	16 %
8	Incident Management	12 %
9	Business Continuity	12 %
10	Information Security Controls Assessment	11 %
11	Project Management	9 %
12	Software Development	6 %
13	Law, Policy, and Ethics	6 %
14	Organizational Awareness	6 %

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Rank	Skill		(Occurrenc	e
15	Intelligence Analysis			6 %	6
16	Enterprise Architecture			6 %	6
17	Data Analysis			3 %	6
18	Identity Management			1 %	⁄0
19	System Administration			1 %	⁄0
20	Policy Development			1 %	⁄0
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Table 4. Skills for CISO profile

Table 5 presents a side-by-side comparison of the top 10 skills as they appear in the general pool of job advertisements versus those specifically associated with the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) role. The skills shared between the two columns are highlighted with the same color to denote overlap, indicating their relevance across the wider cybersecurity job market as well as their particular importance to the CISO position.

For the general ads, the skill 'Collaborate and Communicate' appears at the top, followed by a list that leans towards technical expertise such as 'Information Systems and Network Security', and 'Information Security Controls Assessment'. 'Business Continuity' and 'Threat Analysis' also feature prominently, reflecting a balanced mix of strategic and operational capabilities.

In the CISO-specific column, 'Collaborate and Communicate' again leads the list, underlining the critical nature of communication skills for leadership roles. 'Threat Analysis' and 'Data Security' are notably higher on the CISO list than in the general ads, which may reflect the strategic risk management responsibilities of the CISO. Other skills such as 'Testing and Evaluation', and 'Operating Systems' are unique to the CISO profile in terms that these skills do not appear among the top 10 skills in the general pool of job advertisements, highlighting the hands-on technical knowledge that is expected of a CISO, in addition to their management duties. The overlaps, particularly in 'Incident Management' and 'Business Continuity', under-score that while the CISO is a leadership role, it still demands a firm grasp of the technical and operational aspects of cybersecurity.

<u>All Ads</u>	CISO ads
Collaborate and Communicate	Collaborate and Communicate
Information Systems and Network Secu-	Threat Analysis
rity	
Information Security Controls Assess-	Data Security
ment	
Business Continuity	Information Systems and Network Secu-
	<u>rity</u>
Threat Analysis	Risk Management
Risk Management	Testing and Evaluation
Organizational Awareness	Operating Systems
Incident Management	Incident Management



Data Security	Business Continuity
Enterprise Architecture and Infrastruc-	Information Security Controls Assess-
<u>ture Design</u>	<u>ment</u>

Table 5. Top 10 skills: all adds v. CISO ads

To conclude, the REWIRE's dual strategy, using the Job Ads Analyzer and Stakeholders' survey, has produced important insights for better understanding of overall situation in cybersecurity skills market. By aligning with established skills frameworks and role profiles, REWIRE has effectively mapped the current and future needs of the cybersecurity workforce. The data derived from these tools is crucial for shaping targeted educational and professional development initiatives, ensuring the cybersecurity sector meets emerging challenges with a well-equipped and proficient workforce.

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4. CYBERSECURITY THREATS TRENDS

This chapter aims to conduct a comparative analysis of different sectoral surveys and studies as well as the national threats trends reports to identify the latest cybersecurity threats trends which emerged over the last year. It is important to track the emerging threats in order to be able to react and adapt the respective cybersecurity skills necessary to the new trends.

The ENISA Threat Landscape report of 2023 (ENISA report) indicates that the primary threats identified in 2022 remain the same.ⁱⁱⁱ The prime threats identified due to their prominence over the reporting period are ransomware, malware, social engineering, threats against data, threats against availability and integrity, disinformation – misinformation, and supply-chain attacks.



Figure 3. Cybersecurity Threats Identified in both 2022 and 2023

Ransomware remains the main cybersecurity threat globally. According to ENISA, it ranked at the top during the reporting period (31,32 percent of reported incidents).^{iv} ENISA defines ransomware as a type of attack where threat actors take control of a target's assets and demand a ransom in exchange for the return of the asset's availability. This broad definition encompasses the evolving landscape of ransomware threats, the widespread use of diverse extortion methods, and the variety of objectives of the perpetrators, which extend beyond merely financial gains.^v UK NCSC indicates that ransomware is an illicit commercial enterprise - an evolving threat as the criminals chase the best ways to make money. During previous years, ransomware principally threatened to block organisations from accessing their systems through encryption. Currently, the UK NCSC is progressively observing data extortion as a substantial part of the ransomware business model as criminals understand that organisations are willing to pay to prevent the leaking of their data.^{vi} The ACSC assessed that ransomware continue to be the most destructive cybercrime threat. Ransomware directly affected every sector of the Australian economy in the previous fiscal year.^{vii} As reported by Truesec 2023, cybercrime is an international issue, with cybercriminals capable of launching attacks

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from any location. Ransomware continues to be the foremost cyber threat facing organizations. This encompasses a range from broadly disseminated, automated ransomware campaigns to "big game hunting" attacks, wherein teams of skilled cybercriminals manually target organizations with precision attacks.^{viii}

Ransomware numbers. According to UK NCSC, ransomware is one of the most significant cyber security threats facing businesses and organisations in the UK. Successfully deployed ransomware can potentially prevent public services and businesses from operating and putting their data at significant risk. Last year the UK NCSC coordinated the national response to 18 ransomware attacks including the attacks on a supplier to NHS 111, and South Stafford-shire Water. However, the actual count of ransomware attacks in the UK annually is significantly greater, since many organizations frequently fail to report these breaches.^{ix} The UK NCSC observes that there had been an increase in sophisticated, high-impact ransomware incidents against critical infrastructure organisations globally. Due to its potential impact on critical national infrastructure and essential services, ransomware is regarded as a national security risk.^x As ACSC observed, leading ransomware groups persist in targeting Australian 'big game' entities – those that are high-profile, high-value, or critical service providers. Although global trends show a decrease in targeting such 'big game' entities and a shift towards smaller and medium-sized businesses, this trend has not yet become evident in Australia.^{xi}

In Australia, the ACSC received 447 ransomware cybercrime reports. Although this represents a 10 percent reduction from the 2020–21 fiscal year, the reports still exceed those in 2019–20. Additionally, it's probable that ransomware incidents are considerably underreported, particularly by victims who opt to pay the ransom.^{xii} In 2021–22, the education and training sector reported the highest number of ransomware incidents, up from being the fourth most reported sector in 2020–21. The risk to this sector is considerable due to its business model, which emphasizes open, collaborative environments.

Additionally, the shift to remote learning during the coronavirus pandemic led to the introduction of numerous personal devices and new software into the sector.^{xiii} Overall, during the 2021–22 financial year, the top 5 sectors reporting ransomware incidents comprised 47 percent of all ransomware-related cybercrime reports.^{xiv} Consequently, the ACSC addressed 135 cyber security incidents connected to ransomware, marking an increase of over 75 percent compared to the 2019–20 period. In addition, the ACSC identified and notified 148 organisations of ransomware activity.^{xv}

In 2023, Truesec noted a decrease in ransomware attacks among our clients during the first half of 2022. This decline occurred as cybercriminals restructured some of their financial operations in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and ensuing sanctions. However, this impact was short-lived; in the latter half of 2022, Truesec estimated a 25% increase in ransomware incidents compared to the prior year.^{xvi}

Ransomware payment dynamics. The UK NCSC suggests that ransom payment motivates harmful actions by perpetrators and does not ensure networks' decryption or give back taken data.^{xvii} According to ACSC, ransomware victims still used third-party negotiators to facilitate payment of ransom demands in 2021–22. The extent of coverage offered by cyber insurance policies also plays a role in how victims handle and resolve these incidents and in a business's

decision on whether to pay the ransom.^{xviii} A 2022 Australian Institute of Criminology study revealed that only 19 percent of ransomware victims turned to the police or the ACSC for advice or support. However, the research indicated that nearly 60 percent sought assistance from at least one formal source beyond their family or friends. The study also showed that 23.2 percent of small to medium business victims paid the ransom, resulting in the payment of millions of dollars in ransoms and related expenses.xix As reported by Sophos 2023, ransomware groups are also looking into broader ways to diversify their operations. A prime instance of this is the expansion of leak sites, where attackers publicize information about their victims. Historically, the model has been straightforward: if organizations pay the ransom, their data isn't posted on the leak site; if they don't pay, it is. However, this year has witnessed some intriguing evolutions in this area.^{xx}

Ransomware as a Service (RaaS). The UK NCSC observed an increased use of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) where less-skilled affiliates can rent different types of ransomware, enabling them to execute cyber-attacks without having to create the ransomware on their own. This expansion allows a broader spectrum of criminal actors to access the ransomware attack method, previously limited to individuals with the necessary technical skills. The UK NCSC noted that although reports in May 2022 indicated the discontinuation of the Conti ransomware strain, by August of the same year, this had not resulted in a decreased ransomware threat to the UK. This was because some members of the organized crime group responsible for Conti shifted to other ransomware groups. Consequently, the UK NCSC anticipates a more varied and potent ransomware environment.xxi The ACSC noted the rise of new and potentially rebranded RaaS operations throughout 2021–22. The presence of RaaS options provides cybercriminals with a variety of tools to choose from. Additionally, ransomware syndicates have further professionalized by employing third parties to negotiate with victims, facilitate the receipt of ransom payments, and resolve disputes among actors. xxii

In addition, according to ACSC, the business model of ransomware groups has continued to develop. Now, some of these groups are sharing information about their victims, amplifying the ransomware threat as victims may face attacks from multiple groups. For instance, following its closure announcement, the BlackMatter group handed over its victims to the ransomware infrastructure of another group, Lockbit 2.0. Additionally, in October 2021, members of the Conti ransomware group were reported to have started selling access to their victims' networks, allowing subsequent targeting by other entities.xxiii

In 2021–22, ransomware actors persisted in integrating extra extortion methods into their activities to more efficiently secure payments from victims. ACSC noted that the tactic of using both data encryption and threats to disclose sensitive information publicly to coerce ransomware victims into paying is termed 'double extortion'. Victims who might have previously recovered from a ransomware attack through regular backups can still be susceptible to reputational harm due to 'double extortion'. This is referred to as 'multifaceted extortion'. Additional extortion tactics used include persuading third-party stakeholders to pressure victims into negotiations and conducting continuous DDoS attacks on the victim's network during ransom negotiations. xxiv

According to CrowdStrike 2023, throughout 2022, perpetrators consistently demonstrated their capacity to adapt, fragment, regroup, and thrive despite defensive strategies. Following

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AGREEMENT NO 621701-EPP-1-2020-1-LT-EPPKA2-SA-B the shutdown of some of the largest and most infamous ransomware enterprises, affiliates transitioned to new Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operations. Moreover, over 2,500 advertisements for access were discovered across the criminal underground, marking a 112% increase from 2021 and clearly indicating a growing demand for access broker services.^{xxv} As noted by Sophos 2023, although there has been some disruption of ransomware groups in the past year due to factors such as geopolitical unrest and occasional prosecutions, new groups have emerged from the remnants of old ones, and ransomware activity continues to be one of the most widespread cybercrime threats to organizations. Ransomware operators are persistently evolving their methods and mechanisms, aiming to avoid detection and integrate new techniques.^{xxvi}

As reported by Sophos 2023, Several ransomware groups have started utilizing new programming languages to complicate detection efforts, to enable easier compilation of the ransomware executable across various operating systems or platforms, or simply because the malware developers are skilled in these languages and tools. For example, BlackCat and Hive ransomware developers have adopted the Rust programming language, whereas the malware from BlackByte is written in Go (also known as GoLang).xxvii In addition to diversifying the programming languages used, ransomware has also altered its targeting strategy, moving beyond solely focusing on Windows systems. RedAlert, or N13V, targets both Windows and Linux ESXi servers, similar to Luna, another ransomware strain based on Rust. However, it's not just lesser-known groups making these changes; researchers discovered a Linux-ESXi variant of the prominent LockBit ransomware at the beginning of the year. These shifts in targeted platforms open up more opportunities for threat actors – expanding the attack surface, increasing pressure on victims, and potentially reducing the risk of detection, especially since the majority of anti-ransomware defences are primarily focused on Windows.xxviii Groups like Karakurt and AvosLocker have also adopted this trend, setting up auctions for stolen data. Others, like Snatch, are considering shifting their leak disclosures to a subscription model. Some sites are adding a new dimension to post-disclosure processes; if a victim pays, not only is their information kept private, but even the occurrence of the breach itself remains undisclosed. Suppose the breach has already been announced on leak sites. In that case, that mention is removed upon payment – potentially implicating the victim in hiding incidents that, in many countries, are legally required to be reported to regulators.xxix

According to Truesec 2023, modern ransomware syndicates have evolved into organized businesses. Truesec and the broader cybersecurity community have frequently labelled ransomware criminals as "gangs," but this term might not accurately reflect their nature. Structurally, major ransomware syndicates resemble contemporary tech startups more than traditional street gangs. This enhanced organization leads to specialization. Actors within ransomware ecosystems often focus on specific skills and trade or lease their expertise and tools to others within an extensive criminal economy.^{xxx} In examining the primary attack methods employed in serious ransomware incidents, Tuesec noticed that the three most prevalent vectors continue to be the same as in 2021: phishing emails, vulnerability exploits, and the use of valid credentials for remote services like VPNs and RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol).^{xxxi}

Yet, the most significant shift observed in 2022 compared to 2021 was the increased use of valid credentials to infiltrate organizations. This trend aligns with the swiftly expanding

market of Initial Access Brokers (IABs) – cybercriminals specialising in stealing credentials and selling them to other cybercriminals, including ransomware groups. Implementing multifactor authentication (MFA) should be a compulsory measure. However, it's noteworthy that some IABs have started providing services to bypass MFA by utilizing stolen tokens.^{xxxii}

Ransomware and Russia. Most ransomware criminal groups targeting the UK are based in and around Russia, UK NCSC noticed. While the degree to which the Kremlin controls these ransomware groups is not clear, individuals operating within Russia's borders enjoy implicit approval from the Russian State.^{xxxiii} Sophos 2023 reported, that observed a few lesser-known ransomware or leak groups that appear to be politically motivated, unlike some of their more notorious counterparts. One such example is a leak site focused on distributing materials from breaches involving Ukrainian citizens and government organizations. However, the source of this data and whether ransomware plays a role in its acquisition remains unclear.^{xxxiv}

In turn, the New Zealand NCSC observed less high-impact ransomware and distributed denialof-service (DDoS) activities in 2021/2022 than in 2020/2021. Possibly, the decrease in ransomware and DDoS attacks targeting New Zealand during 2021/2022 is linked to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The invasion has undoubtedly disturbed cyber criminals operating in Russia and Ukraine, probably leading them to shift their strategic goals. The noted decrease in ransomware aligns with global trends seen in early 2022, DDoS activity has been more turbulent before and after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. DDoS activity surged in several countries, such as Ukraine, Russia, and various nations opposing Russia's invasion of Ukraine, while it declined in other areas.^{xxxv}

The majority of cybercrime incidents addressed by Truesec are traced back to cybercriminals based in Russia. Ransomware, especially, is closely linked to the Russian cybercrime ecosystem.^{xxxvi}

Malware is another significant category of threats distinguished by the majority of reports. According to ENISA, it comprised a significant part of incidents over the reporting period (8,24 percent of reported incidents).^{xxxvii} Malware, also called malicious code and logic, is an overarching term used to describe any software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorised process that will adversely impact the confidentiality, integrity or availability of a system.^{xxxviii}

According to UK NCSC, malware is a low sophisticated cyber security threat that most British public are likely to experience. Cyber criminals deploy commodity attacks, such as phishing or malware with the aim of scamming the public and businesses.^{xxxix} Yet, as observed by CrowdStrike, there was a continued shift away from malware use, with malware-free activity accounting for 71% of all detections in 2022 (up from 62% in 2021). This situation was partly due to adversaries' extensive use of valid credentials to gain and maintain access in victim environments. Another contributing factor was the frequency of new vulnerabilities being disclosed and the speed with which adversaries could operationalize the exploits.^{xl}

As noted by ACSC, cyberspace is increasingly the domain of warfare, as seen in Russia's use of malware designed to destroy data and prevent computers from booting in Ukraine. Russia was not the only nation leveraging cyber operations to advance its strategic interests. ^{xli} CrowdStrike reported, that on February 23, 2022, just within 48 hours, new wiper malware

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AGREEMENT NO. 621701-EPP-1-2020-1-LT-EPPKA2-SA-B variants such as *DriveSlayer*, *PartyTicket*, *IsaacWiper*, and *AcidRain* were unleashed against specific networks, aligning with the onset of Russia's military invasion in the early hours of February 24, 2022. The use of *AcidRain* was particularly significant, occurring less than an hour after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the "special military operation." This malware seemed tailor-made to target and disrupt segments of the Viasat satellite communications network, which was crucial for providing network connectivity in Ukraine. The full extent of this early strike against Ukrainian government and military communications systems is still somewhat ambiguous, but its effects extended beyond Ukraine's borders. The disruption impacted at least three internet service providers across Europe, leading to service outages for thousands of customers and affecting the network communications of wind turbines in certain regions of Germany.^{xlii}

In July 2021, the Australian Government openly attributed the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities to China's Ministry of State Security. Additionally, a joint advisory from the Five-Eyes intelligence alliance in November 2021 confirmed that an Iranian state actor also exploited these vulnerabilities. The evolving regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific are heightening the risk of crises, and it's likely that states will use cyber operations as a tool to challenge the sovereignty of others.^{xliii} UK NCSC observed that Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine was supported by vast cyber activity. In numerous cases, Russian cyber operations have been synchronized with their kinetic military activities. Initial signs of such cyber activities often manifested as DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks and the deployment of destructive wiper malware targeting various Ukrainian entities.^{xliv} According to ACSC during the 2021–22 financial year, destructive malware used by Russia resulted in significant damage in Ukraine itself, also causing collateral damage to European networks and higher risk to networks worldwide.^{xlv}

New Zealand NCSC reported that the most significant CVE disclosed in the 2021/2022 year was the Apache Log4j vulnerability. In December 2021, a significant vulnerability was identified in Apache Log4j, a widely used open-source logging library in many Java-based applications. This flaw exposed global networks to various cyber threats, including the potential for remote system access by malicious actors, data theft, unauthorized data export, and malware infections. The New Zealand NCSC issued an advisory to its clients, providing guidance on mitigating this vulnerability and detecting associated cyber threats. Leveraging their MFN (Managed Firewall Network) capability, the NCSC could swiftly distribute thousands of indicators of Log4j-related activities and proactively block them in almost real-time, thereby safeguard-ing organizations in Aotearoa New Zealand. In December 2021 alone, MFN partners successfully interrupted over 20,000 Log4j-related incidents on their customer networks.^{xlvi}

According to Sophos 2023, many aspects of the threat landscape have evolved over the past year, however, one of the most notable developments is the ongoing evolution and expansion of the cybercriminal economy. That ecosystem has increasingly transformed into an industry in its own right, complete with a network of supporting services and highly professionalized, systematic approaches to its operations.^{xlvii}

Access brokers, ransomware, information-stealing malware, malware delivery, and other elements of cybercrime operations have reduced the entry barriers for aspiring cybercriminals.^{xlviii} Criminal marketplaces like Genesis enable entry-level cybercriminals to buy malware

and malware deployment services. Subsequently, these cybercriminals can then sell stolen credentials and other data in bulk. $^{\rm xlix}$

Social engineering is the third category of threats distinguished in analysed reports. According to ENISA, it comprised a 7,88 percent of incidents over the reporting period.¹ ENISA observes, that social engineering covers a wide range of tactics aimed at exploiting human errors or behaviours to gain access to information or services. It involves different manipulation strategies to deceive victims into making errors or handing over confidential or sensitive information. Users might be enticed to open documents, files, or emails, visit websites, or provide access to systems or services. While these lures and tricks might exploit technological aspects, their success primarily hinges on manipulating the human element. The primary attack vectors in this threat landscape include phishing, spear-phishing, whaling, smishing, vishing, watering hole attack, baiting, pretexting, quid pro quo, honeytraps and scareware. While commonly employed to secure initial access, social engineering methods can also be utilized in later stages of an incident or breach. Prominent examples include business email compromise (BEC), fraud, impersonation, counterfeiting, and, more recently, extortion.^{li} According to Truesec 2023, social engineering is a significant factor in numerous cyber breaches. Phishing emails, which primarily use social engineering, deceive employees into inadvertently assisting criminals from within the organization.^{lii}

CrowdStrike noted a rise in social engineering tactics involving direct human contact, like vishing, which have effectively distributed malware or bypassed multifactor authentication (MFA). This trend highlights the ongoing significance of personal interaction in the success of cybercrime activities.^{liii} The growing prevalence of malware-free attacks and social engineering strategies aimed at gaining access or credentials underscores the inadequacy of traditional endpoint-only security solutions. The need for integrated identity protection, closely coordinated across endpoints, identity, and data, has become crucial. Implementing conditional, risk-based access policies is key to minimizing the burden and fatigue of multifactor authentication (MFA) for legitimate users. liv Truesec 2023 added that with organisations' increasing adoption of multifactor authentication (MFA), cybercriminals are turning to social engineering attacks to circumvent MFA protections. These social engineering tactics can range from straightforward brute force attacks, where the attacker persistently attempts to log in, hoping the targeted victim will inadvertently approve their access, to more complex schemes. In these elaborate setups, the attacker might impersonate an employee within the organization, contacting IT support to seek assistance in accessing the network, thus exploiting human vulnerability within the security chain. ^{Iv}

According to CrowdStrike, since at least March 2022, SCATTERED SPIDER has been executing focused social engineering campaigns, predominantly targeting companies in the customer relationship management and business process outsourcing sectors. This adversary mainly employs phishing pages to harvest authentication details for systems like Okta, VPNs, or edge devices. Additionally, they manipulate users into divulging their one-time password MFA codes or exploit them by creating fatigue through repeated MFA notifications.^{Ivi} Once initial access is obtained, SCATTERED SPIDER employs a broad range of legitimate remote monitoring and management tools, along with utilities like PuTTY, to maintain persistent access.^{Ivii}

SCATTERED SPIDER utilizes its access to technology firms to target third-party companies, notably focusing on customers of the attacked businesses, with a significant emphasis on infiltrating cellular service providers. Although the full operational objectives of SCATTERED SPI-DER aren't completely known, the adversary has been detected engaging in SIM swapping via access to these cellular services. This tactic of SIM swapping is presumed to facilitate subsequent compromises of third-party entities.^{Iviii}

According to Truesec 2023, effective cybersecurity should incorporate measures that reduce employee vulnerability to these social engineering attacks. However, the ultimate defence against such threats also heavily depends on human vigilance. The success of social engineering tactics can likely be attributed to insufficient training and awareness among personnel in recognizing and evading these types of attacks. Implementing MFA is crucial for securing your environment, yet the effectiveness of this protection hinges on your staff's correct response to prompts from MFA authenticators. This necessitates comprehensive training, as people are routinely overwhelmed with authentication requests, ranging from web cookies to login attempts. Maintaining constant alertness in these conditions can be challenging. Additionally, fostering a workplace culture where "there are no stupid questions" is vital. Such an environment encourages employees to freely approach the security team with any queries or doubts, further strengthening the organization's cybersecurity posture.^{lix} Sophos 2023 observed that technology plays a vital role in detecting and preventing intrusions, but the true cornerstone in averting breaches lies with the security teams. For these teams, regular practice is key to perfection. It's important to foster an environment that consistently engages in tabletop exercises and red/blue team simulations to pinpoint and rectify vulnerabilities in cybersecurity strategies and responses. Moreover, it's not just the security teams that should be involved in these exercises — initiating user-awareness programs is crucial to counter the persistent threats of phishing and other forms of social engineering.^{Ix}

According to Truesec 2023, some cybercriminals are experimenting with even more sophisticated social engineering attacks. ^{Ixi} The FBI recently alerted the public that an unidentified threat actor, posing as an IT engineer, applied for a remote role at a major IT company. In an elaborate scheme, the attacker used photos of the person they were impersonating to generate an AI-driven deepfake for the job interview conducted remotely. The goal was to secure employment in a remote position, thereby gaining access to the company's network. Truesec has also noted that cybercriminals are increasingly trying to procure software for AI programming to create deepfake videos. With the rapid advancements in AI chat technologies like "ChatGPT," there's a growing likelihood that these tools will be exploited to enhance social engineering tactics. This could lead to more convincing phishing emails and potentially enable partial automation of social engineering attacks in the future.^{Ixii}

Threats against data is another category of threats distinguished in analysed reports, comprising 20,09 percent of incidents over reporting period.^{1xiii} Data breach is defined in the GDPR as any breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration or unauthorised disclosure of or access to personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed (article 4.12 GDPR). ENISA has highlighted that, from a technical standpoint, threats targeting data can primarily be categorized as either a data breach or a data leak. While these

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terms are often used interchangeably, they represent distinct concepts, mainly differing in their mode of occurrence. A data breach refers to a deliberate cyber-attack orchestrated by a cybercriminal with the aim of unauthorized access and dissemination of sensitive, confidential, or protected information. In essence, a data breach is a targeted and aggressive assault on a system or organization with the motive of data theft. On the other hand, a data leak is an incident (which could result from misconfigurations, vulnerabilities, or human mistakes) leading to the inadvertent loss or exposure of sensitive, confidential, or protected information. It's worth noting that intentional attacks sometimes fall under the term "data exposure".^{lxiv}

According to UK NCSC, hacking of social media and email accounts, aimed at extorting money from victims for account access or to compromise data for committing or facilitating fraud, has seen a significant rise over the past year. In the period of 2021/22, there were a total of 8,023 reported instances of social media account hacking, marking a 23.5% increase compared to the previous year.^{lxv} In 2022, CrowdStrike noted a 20% rise in the number of adversaries engaging in data theft and extortion campaigns, notably without the deployment of ransomware.^{lxvi}

According to ACSC, Cybercriminals are increasingly focusing on employees' and customers' Personal Identifiable Information (PII), aiming to maximize the commercial and reputational damage caused by data breaches. In the most recent financial year, human resources organizations, especially those involved in payroll and recruitment, have become prime targets for ransomware attackers. These organizations are particularly vulnerable because they offer services across various sectors. In the fiscal year 2021–22, breaches of payroll service providers resulted in the access and exposure of data belonging to hundreds of thousands of Australian employees.^{bxvii} Organizations providing social assistance, holding sensitive information about individuals, have been targeted by cybercriminals both in Australia and globally. A notable instance occurred in January 2022 when the Swiss-based International Committee of the Red Cross disclosed that a ransomware attack on its servers had compromised the personal data of over half a million individuals. This breach affected a wide range of people, including refugees and those internally displaced in conflict areas around the world.^{bxviii}

Ransomware groups are diversifying their operations, as evidenced by the expanding use of leak sites. These sites are where cybercriminals publish information about their victims. The traditional model has been straightforward: if the targeted organizations pay the ransom, their data is kept off the leak site; if they refuse to pay, their data is published.^{lxix}

Threats against availability and integrity of data is another significant category of threats. According to ENISA, it comprises 21,4 percent of DDoS over the reporting period.^{lxx} DDoS attacks, which primarily target the availability of systems and data, remain a significant component in the cybersecurity threat landscape. These attacks hinder users from accessing necessary data, services, or resources by overwhelming or exhausting the service and its resources or overloading the network infrastructure's components.^{lxx}



Disinformation and misinformation (or information manipulation) comprised 4,81 percent of incidents over reporting period.^{Ixxii} According to ENISA, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) refers to a pattern of behavior, often not illegal, that threatens or potentially negatively impacts values, procedures, and political processes. FIMI activities are characterized by their manipulative nature, conducted with intent and coordination. Both state and non-state actors, along with their proxies within and outside their territories, can engage in FIMI. This report examines the threat of FIMI, irrespective of its origin.^{Ixxiii}

As reported by UK UNSC, malicious cyber actors frequently use disinformation to create confusion and exploit divisions among target groups. In the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian leadership propagated disinformation and misinformation globally about Ukraine and its allies to advance their preferred narrative. To counter this Russian disinformation, the unprecedented release of intelligence by the Five Eyes intelligence alliance has played a vital role. Although the UK NCSC has a limited role in addressing disinformation, it remains attentive to reports from security partners and the public regarding such disinformation campaigns.^{lxxiv}

According to Sophos 2023, following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the Russian government was poised to strongly incentivize its domestic cybercriminal syndicates to sway global opinion in its favour, while undermining the international support garnered by the Ukrainian President. This led to a concerted effort by ransomware operators, malware distributors, and disinformation cells to mobilize in support of Russia's military actions. These groups activated their resources and capabilities to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disrupt the digital solidarity with Ukraine, marking a significant moment where cyber operations and geopolitical strategies converged.^{lxxv} Ukraine is currently facing a severe cyber threat environment, with less extensive but notable disturbances affecting the broader Western world. The risk of escalating conflict, misinformation, and further instability continues to be a significant concern. Ixxvi

A supply chain attack is the last threat category distinguished by ENISA and other reports. According to ENISA, a supply chain attack targets the relationship between organisations and their suppliers. As stated in the ENISA Threat Landscape for Supply Chain Attacks, an attack is considered to have a supply chain component when it consists of a combination of at least two attacks.^{lxxvii} An attack is defined as a supply chain attack when it involves compromising both the provider and their clients. The SolarWinds incident highlighted this attack vector and its far-reaching consequences, where malicious cyber actors strategically compromised a legitimate software update before the software provider's distribution. Different states attributed the activity to Russian state-sponsored actors in April 2021. Ixxviii Threat actors persist in exploiting supply chains to infiltrate organizations, taking advantage of these interconnected systems' extensive reach and multitude of potential victims.^{lxxix}

As reported by UK NCSC, global supply chain vulnerabilities remained evident as attackers infiltrated networks of target organizations through third-party vendors or suppliers. The exposure of the Log4J vulnerability underscored the difficulties posed by flaws in IT systems that can be leveraged to execute effective attacks.^{lxxx}

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The swiftly expanding and ever-more complex technology ecosystem presents greater opportunities for criminals and state actors to pursue their objectives. Supply chain attacks demonstrate how adversaries exploit the complexity of this ecosystem: if they can't directly breach an organization, they might exploit weak security in the organization's digital supply chain instead. In the past year, the danger to the global IT infrastructure from foreign states and cybercriminals has likely increased, with both groups enhancing their capabilities in targeting the IT sector. Foreign states often aim at entities to gather intelligence, whereas cybercriminals primarily engage in ransomware or data extortion attacks to generate profit.^{Ixxxi}

As reported by New Zealand NCSC, current organizations need to focus on securing their own networks and their entire supply chain. With the swift global adoption of IoT devices and connected systems, organizations rely on services that extend beyond their immediate oversight and control. Outsourcing technology services can enhance productivity and security. However, it also widens the potential attack surface, thus elevating the risk of exposure to cyber threats.^{Ixxxii} The interconnectedness of the online environment, together with the comprehensive nature of global supply chains and interoperability of technology, leaves networks worldwide increasingly exposed to a range of potential cyber-related impacts. A recent development in supply chain compromise involves the exploitation of software updates as a means of establishing a presence in customer systems.^{Ixxxiii} The New Zealand NCSC assessed that both state- and non-state-sponsored groups will likely continue to seek ways to exploit the digital transformation of organisations, and to infiltrate supply chains via weak access points.^{Ixxxiv}

According to ACSC, foresees the trend of cyber adversaries seeking to compromise multiple victims across various sectors through a single point of entry to persist. For instance, during 2021–22, Managed Service Providers (MSPs) were particularly targeted because they serve a wide range of clients, including government entities, commercial businesses, and not-for-profits of all sizes, making them appealing targets. Malicious actors progressively consider the supply chain a high-priority target and a means for widespread compromise.^{Ixxxv}

In addition, Truesec 2023 reported that Cybercriminals have identified that open-source code libraries can be exploited for supply chain attacks. They have targeted platforms such as GitHub and GitLab, creating forks of widely used code libraries that harbour malware. If these corrupted versions are downloaded, they can infect the user's system. Additionally, some malicious code libraries employ 'typosquatting' to mimic legitimate libraries, deceiving users into downloading compromised versions. There have been thousands of such malevolent code libraries found on GitHub, posing as reputable ones but containing malware. Is the set of the set

Based on the conducted analysis, the following **new threats** could be distinguished from the analysed reports:

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Figure 4. New Cybersecurity Threats Identified in 2023

Content Management System (CMS) risk is an attack on a Content Management System (CMS) software and refers to any unauthorized and malicious activity aimed at compromising the security of a CMS platform. CMS software is used to create, manage, and publish digital content on websites, and because it plays a central role in many websites, it is a common target for various types of cyberattacks. According to statistics available at that time, Word-Press was estimated to be used by over 40% of all websites on the internet. The main attacks include: Brute Force attempts, Vulnerability Exploitation, SQL Injection, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), DDoS attacks, Malware infections, Phishing, and File Inclusion attacks.^{Ixxxvii}

AI (Artificial Intelligence) and generative AI-enabled attacks refer to cyberattacks that leverage artificial intelligence and generative AI techniques to enhance their capabilities and effectiveness. These attacks use AI algorithms and machine learning models to automate and optimize various aspects of the attack process. Attackers use AI to create evolving malware, employ AI algorithms for convincing phishing emails, generate deepfake content for impersonation or disinformation, conduct automated social engineering based on analyzed social media data, accelerate password cracking with AI, analyze network traffic using AI for vulnerabilities, and spread disinformation through AI-generated content.^{Ixxxviii}

Truesec 2023 has also noted that cybercriminals are increasingly trying to procure software for AI programming to create deepfake videos. With the rapid advancements in AI chat technologies like "ChatGPT," there's a growing likelihood that these tools will be exploited to enhance social engineering tactics. This could lead to more convincing phishing emails and potentially enable partial automation of social engineering attacks in the future.^{lxxxix}

Politically motivated attacks or hacktivism: are malicious actions carried out in the digital realm with the primary goal of advancing a political agenda or ideology. These attacks are typically driven by ideological, social, or geopolitical motivations, and they can target governments, political organizations, institutions, corporations, or individuals who are perceived as opposing or representing a threat to the attacker's beliefs or interests.^{xc} According to CrowdStrike 2023, in 2022, hacktivists embraced the climate of misinformation, seizing upon significant geopolitical changes to fuel national unrest and propagate particular ideologies.

Although their actions were primarily focused on targets within the Russo-Ukrainian area, there was a notable increase in collateral activities where entities in neighbouring regions, Europe, and the United States were targeted. This spillover of activities intensified from the second half of 2022 and continued into 2023, reflecting hacktivist operations' expanding scope and impact.^{xci}

According to New Zealand NCSC, Cyber actors expressing support for Russia, as well as those siding with Ukraine, are actively participating in cyber operations linked to the conflict. On the pro-Ukraine side, cyber operations have been conducted by the 'hacktivist' group Anonymous, as well as by individual cyber volunteers enlisting with the IT Army of Ukraine. Pro-Russia cyber activities in relation to the invasion have involved groups such as Killnet, Ghostwriter, and Conti, each engaging in various cyber operations.^{xcii} The proliferation of cyber vigilantes contributes to the risk of accidental escalation. This has presented challenges on the development of international cyber norms and raising questions about what constitutes a proportionate and acceptable response to threats posed by hostile states.^{xciii}

To sum up, the analysis of the last year's sectoral surveys and national threat trends reports reveals a persistent and evolving landscape of cybersecurity threats, with ransomware, malware, and social engineering tactics remaining at the forefront. Despite different patterns and techniques employed by cybercriminals, the consistent rise in ransomware incidents, particularly within critical infrastructure and the adoption of new extortion methods, underlines the ongoing and complex challenges facing cybersecurity professionals. The increased sophistication of ransomware as a service (RaaS), politically motivated attacks, and the leveraging of AI technologies for cyberattacks highlight the need for a dynamic and robust cybersecurity strategy. As threats diversify and tactics become more nuanced, it is crucial for organizations to enhance their defensive measures, improve incident response strategies, and invest in continuous skill development to mitigate the risks of these emerging threats.

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5. CYBERSECURITY SKILLS REQUIRED TO ADDRESS IDENTIFIED THREATS

The purpose of this chapter is to map the main identified cybersecurity threats with the skills required to address the respective threats and link it with the 12 ECSF role profiles.

5.1. Skills and threats mapping methodology

The following methodology has been considered for mapping the identified threats to cybersecurity skills, according to three main axes:

• Identification of threats and skills. To perform this mapping, we relied on the updated list of cybersecurity threats, which was based on a comprehensive review of all threats documented in the year 2022, carefully evaluating their ongoing relevance to the current year, ensuring that they maintain their significance, and on a rigorous examination of most recent 2023 reports, meticulously sifting through their contents. It is also pertinent to emphasize that the requisite job profiles and the associated skills essential for this endeavour have already been thoughtfully detailed and provided within the scope of WP3 through the latest version of the cybersecurity skills framework.

• Association of skills with threats. To effectively address each identified threat, our approach involves an assessment of which precise skills are most pertinent for mitigating or countering these specific identified threats. For instance, threat analysis entails gaining deep insights into the threat's distinctive characteristics, tactics and techniques. We also delve into evaluating its potential impact, the vectors of attack and the vulnerabilities it exploits. Our methodology is firmly rooted in established best practices and practical expertise, ensuring a robust and well-informed strategy for threat mitigation and response.

• Assignment of weights for the mapping. To make a systematic assessment, we have complemented the mapping with a method of assigning numerical weightings for each skill coming from the ECSF role profiles, with the purpose of quantifying its significance in addressing each specific threat. These weightings are designed to accurately reflect the skill efficiency in mitigating the given cybersecurity threat. For this, we have utilized a scale that ranges from 1 to 5, with the weight of 5 signifying the utmost importance and effectiveness in countering the considered cybersecurity threat.

5.2. Mapping results

In this section, we detail the different tables that map the cyber threats across the three considered categories: Operational Technology (OT) Threats, Information Technology (IT)

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Threats, and shared Information Technology Threats, to the skills related to 12 ECSF role profiles. For clarity, we provide two tables for each threat categories, the first table corresponding the first six role profiles, and the second table corresponding to the second six role profiles from the ENISA cybersecurity skills framework. From these tables, we then elaborate on the skills that are the most relevant in addressing the identified threats and the job profiles associated with these skills. We also analyse the coverage of threats by skills for each of the three main threat categories and discuss some refinement of skills to properly address such threats.

5.2.1. Operational Technology (OT) Threats

Table 6 serves as a detailed reference for understanding the link between Operational Technology (OT) threats and the first 6 ECSF role profiles equipped to address them. Each cell within the table contains a curated list of skills associated with a specific job profile, highlighting the expertise required to mitigate Operational Technology (OT) cybersecurity threats effectively.

The mapping of skills with respect to OT threats shows the importance of several key skills from the ENISA cybersecurity skills framework. In particular, effective communication, coordination, and cooperation with internal and external stakeholders is crucial for addressing these cybersecurity threats. Ensuring seamless information sharing, and coordinating responses are essential to properly counter threats, such as those related to the cybersecurity workforce gap, the outsourcing of third parties for ICS architecture management, the remote access to the corporate network, the reliance on external servers for critical infrastructure, and the integration of IT and OT networks. Recognizing and categorizing types of vulnerabilities and their associated attacks are also required to enable proactive measures to secure such systems. Utilizing cyber threat intelligence (CTI) platforms and tools enables also staying well-informed about emerging threats and attack patterns. In addition, conducting ethical hacking, identifying, and solving cybersecurity-related issues, as well as assessing cybersecurity vulnerabilities contribute to address several others, such those related to the vulnerabilities of ICS components, to the use of outdated and obscure components and to content management systems. These skills empower organizations to anticipate Operational Technology (OT) threats and manage the relevant risks in a more efficient manner.

The analysis of the first mapping reveals that all the Operational Technology (OT) threats are covered by at least two skills from the ENISA cybersecurity skills framework. In addition, some skills could be further refined to consider the threats' specificities. In particular, the threats related to the vulnerabilities of ICS components might be covered by more specific skills about the security of ICS systems, such as those linked to SCADA systems, PLCs and more generally to network protocols used in OT environments, by contributing to a more precise response to such threats. In the same manner, cybersecurity threats related to the outsourcing of third parties to manage and maintain the ICS architecture could be further covered by more refined skills on OT security frameworks and standards, as well as on specific industrial processes and technologies.

Overall, this mapping with respect to Operational Technology (OT) threats highlights more specifically, amongst the twelves job profiles from the ENISA skills framework, the following

ones: the penetration tester, the cyber threat intelligence specialist, the cybersecurity educator, the cybersecurity architect, and the cyber incident responder.

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Table 1. The skills and knowledge required to effectively mitigate Operationa	al Technology cybersecurity threats for the first set of the ECSF r	ole profiles
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR-	CYBER INCIDENT RE-	CYBER LEGAL,	CYBER SECU-	CYBER THREAT INTEL-	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT
	MATION SECU-	SPONDER	POLICY &	RITY AUDI-	LIGENCE SPECIALIST	
	RITY OFFICER		COMPLIANCE	TOR		
	(CISO)		OFFICER			
			OPERATIONA	L TECHNOLOGY	THREATS	
Cybersecurity	Influence an or-	-	Understand,	Communi-	Communicate, coordi-	Define, present and promote an information se-
workforce gap	ganisation's cy-		practice and	cate, coordi-	nate and cooperate	curity policy for approval by the senior manage-
	bersecurity cul-		adhere to ethi-	nate and co-	with internal and ex-	ment of the organization (weight: 3)
	ture (weight:		cal require-	operate with	ternal stakeholders	
	2.5)		ments and	internal and	(weight: 4)	
	Motivate and		standards	external		
	encourage peo-		(weight: 4)	stakeholders		
	ple		Educate, mon-	(weight: 4)		
	(weight: 4)		itor and assess			
	Guide, direct		the awareness			
	and motivate		of organiza-			
	others. (weight:		tion members			
	4)		and external			
			parties on cy-			
			bersecurity			
			and privacy is-			
			sues as			
			needed.			
			(weight: 5)			
Vulnerabilities of	-	Recognize and cate-	-	-	Use and apply CTI	Coordinate the integration of security solutions
ICS components		gorize types of vul-			platforms and tools	(weight: 3.5)
		nerabilities and asso-			(weight: 4)	Monitor progress of issues throughout lifecycle
		ciated attacks			Automate threat in-	and communicate effectively (weight: 3)
		(weight: 3)			telligence manage-	Contribute to the development of ICT strategy
					ment procedures	and policy, including ICT security and quality
					(weight: 3)	(weight: 3)

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR-	CYBER INCIDENT RE-	CYBER LEGAL,	CYBER SECU-	CYBER THREAT INTEL-	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT					
	MATION SECU-	SPONDER	POLICY &	RITY AUDI-	LIGENCE SPECIALIST						
	RITY OFFICER		COMPLIANCE	TOR							
	(CISO)		OFFICER								
	OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY THREATS										
Content Manage-	Implement cy-	Secure network com-	-	-	Coordinate the inte-	-					
ment System	bersecurity rec-	munications (weight:			gration of security so-						
(CMS) software	ommendations	4)			lutions (weight: 3)						
	and best prac-										
	tices (weight: 4)	Manage and analyse									
		log files (weight: 4).									
		Collect. analyse and									
		correlate cyber									
		threat information									
		originating from mul-									
		tiple sources									
		(weight: 3)									
Unpatched com-	-	-	-	-	-	Plan and implement application and data provi-					
ponents						sioning (weight: 4)					
						Monitor progress of issues throughout lifecycle					
						and communicate effectively (weight: 3)					
Utilizing of out-	-	-	-	Assess risk	-	Contribute to the development of ICT strategy					
dated and ob-				factors		and policy, including ICT security and quality					
scure compo-				(weight: 4)		(weight: 3)					
nents											
Outsourcing of	-	-	-	Communi-	Communicate, coordi-	-					
the third parties				cate, coordi-	nate and cooperate						
to manage and				nate and co-	with internal and ex-						
maintain the ICS				operate with	ternal stakeholders						
architecture				internal and	(weight: 4)						
				external							
				stakeholders							
				(weight: 4)							

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR-	CYBER INCIDENT RE-	CYBER LEGAL,	CYBER SECU-	CYBER THREAT INTEL-	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT						
	MATION SECU-	SPONDER	POLICY &	RITY AUDI-	LIGENCE SPECIALIST							
	RITY OFFICER		COMPLIANCE	TOR								
	(CISO)		OFFICER									
	OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY THREATS											
Remote access to	-	-	Enforce and	-	Use and apply CTI	Contribute to the development of ICT strategy						
the corporate			advocate or-		platforms and tools	and policy, including ICT security and quality						
network			ganisation's		(weight: 3)	(weight: 3)						
			data privacy									
			and protection									
			program									
			(weight: 4)									
			Explain and									
			communicate									
			data protec-									
			tion and pri-									
			vacy topics to									
			stakeholders									
			and users									
			(weight: 4)									
Utilizing external	-	Work on operating	-	Communi-	Use and apply CTI	-						
servers for criti-		systems, servers,		cate, coordi-	platforms and tools							
cal infrastructure		clouds and relevant		nate and co-	(weight: 4) Communi-							
architecture		infrastructures		operate with	cate, coordinate and							
		(weight: 4)		internal and	cooperate with inter-							
				external	nal and external							
				stakenoiders	stakenoiders (weight:							
				(weight: 2.5)	2.5)							
Integration of IT	-	Work on operating	-	-	Use and apply CTI	Guide and communicate with implementers and						
and OT networks		systems, servers,			platforms and tools	IT/OT personnel (weight: 4)						
		clouds and relevant			(weight: 3)							
		infrastructures										
		(weight: 4)										

Table 2. The skills and knowledge required to effectively mitigate Operational Technology cybersecurity threats for the second set of the ECSF role profiles

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY EDUCA-	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY	DIGITAL FOREN-	PENETRATION TESTER
	TOR	IMPLEMENTER	RESEARCHER	RISK MANAGER	SICS INVESTIGA-	
					TOR	
		OPERAT	IONAL TECHNOLOGY	THREATS		
Cybersecurity work-	Utilise existing cybersecu-	Communicate, pre-	Communicate, pre-	Communicate, pre-	-	Communicate, present and
force gap	rity-related training re-	sent and report to	sent and report to	sent and report to		report to relevant stakehold-
	sources (weight: 3)	relevant stakehold-	relevant stakehold-	relevant stakehold-		ers (weight: 4)
		ers (weight: 4)	ers (weight: 4)	ers (weight: 4)		Explain and communicate
	Advise on appropriate so-		Generate new			technical cybersecurity top-
	lutions in the field of skills		ideas and transfer			ics appropriately to a variety
	certification schemes, tak-		theory into prac-			of stakeholders. (weight: 4)
	ing into consideration the		tice (weight: 3)			
	needs of the interested		communicate,			
	parties (weight: 4)		(weight: 2.5)			
			(weight: 5.5)			
	Convey complex infor-					
	mation, concepts, or ideas					
	effectively through verbal,					
	written, and/or visual					
	means and to different lev-					
	els of audience (weight: 4)					
	Gauge learner under-					
	standing and knowledge					
	level and, provide effective					
	feedback to students for					
	improving learning					
	(weight: 3)					
Vulnerabilities of ICS	Monitor evolving security	-	-	-	Recognize and	Conduct ethical hacking
components	and privacy				categorize types	(weight: 4)

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY EDUCA- TOR	CYBERSECURITY IMPLEMENTER	CYBERSECURITY RESEARCHER	CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGER	DIGITAL FOREN- SICS INVESTIGA- TOR	PENETRATION TESTER				
OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY THREATS										
	infrastructures, technolo- gies and methods (weight: 3)				of vulnerabilities and associated at- tacks (weight: 2.5)	Identify and solve cyberse- curity-related issues (weight: 4) Assess cybersecurity vulner- abilities (weight: 4)				
Content Manage- ment System (CMS) software	Monitor evolving security and privacy infrastruc- tures, technologies and methods (weight: 3)	-	-	-	-	Conduct ethical hacking (weight: 4) Identify and solve cyberse- curity-related issues (weight: 4)				
Unpatched compo- nents	-	Develop code, scripts and pro- grammes (weight: 3)	-	Build a cybersecu- rity risk-aware envi- ronment (weight: 2.5)	-	Conduct ethical hacking (weight: 4) Identify and solve cyberse- curity-related issues (weight: 4) Develop codes, scripts and programmes (weight: 3)				
Utilizing of outdated and obscure compo- nents	Monitor evolving security and privacy infrastruc- tures, technologies and methods (weight: 3)	Develop code, scripts and pro- grammes (weight: 3)	-	-	-	Conduct ethical hacking (weight: 4) Identify and solve cyberse- curity-related issues (weight: 4)				
Outsourcing of the third parties to man- age and maintain the ICS architecture	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Remote access to the corporate net- work	Apply network protection components and security controls (weight: 4.5)	-	Conduct network configuration and setup (weight: 4)	-	-	Conduct ethical hacking (weight: 4) Identify and solve cyberse- curity-related issues (weight: 4)				

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY EDUCA- TOR	CYBERSECURITY IMPLEMENTER	CYBERSECURITY RESEARCHER	CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGER	DIGITAL FOREN- SICS INVESTIGA-	PENETRATION TESTER
					TOR	
		OPERAT	IONAL TECHNOLOGY	THREATS		
Utilizing external servers for critical infrastructure archi- tecture	-	-	-	Build a cybersecu- rity risk-aware envi- ronment (weight: 3)	-	-
Integration of IT and OT networks	-	-	Conduct network configuration and setup (weight: 4)	-	-	-

5.2.2. Information Technology (IT) Threats

Table 8 and Table 9 provide a comprehensive mapping between Information Technology (IT) threats and first and the second 6 ECSF role profiles. Each cell of the table provides a list of skills associated with a particular job profile that can be harnessed to counter the specific IT security threat outlined.

The mapping of skills with respect to Information Technology (IT) threats also provides interesting elements regarding the key skills from the ENISA cybersecurity skills framework for addressing such threats. In particular, securing network communications is of major importance to prevent multiple cybersecurity threats, including compromising of communication equipment, network eavesdropping, traffic analysis, broken authentication, and man-inthe-middle attacks. Applying network protection components and security controls contribute complementarily to such prevention against DDoS attacks, POS intrusions, DNS cache poisoning, and DNS spoofing. Conducting ethical hacking, as already shown with the Operational Technology (OT) threats, enables identifying vulnerabilities at an early stage to prevent their exploitation through cybersecurity attacks, and enables addressing several threats, such as those regarding injection flaws, cross-site scripting, insecure deserialization, and more generally web application attacks and advanced persistent threats (APT). Using specific tools, techniques, and methods in relation to digital forensics helps in investing the root cause of an attack, and in better quantifying its impact, in link with threats such as vulnerabilities affecting mobile applications or ransomware campaigns. Skills regarding security and privacy infrastructures, technologies, and methods also permit to address critical threats, such as privacy infringements and identity theft.

The analysis of this second mapping shows that around 75% of the Information Technology (IT) threats are covered by at least two skills from the ENISA cybersecurity skill framework. In addition, the refinement of some skills could contribute to better address some of the identified threats. More specifically, the threat related to large-scale attacks on IoT (medical devices) could benefit from skills more specific to medical device protection and regulations. Secure firmware development, data transmission, and lifecycle management, network segmentation, and real-time monitoring can further strengthen medical IoT devices' security. Also, the threats regarding social engineering are increased by the advances in the area of generative artificial intelligence. This requires further understanding of AI-driven social engineering tactics, and better exploitation of methods and techniques for efficiently detecting and countering AI-enhanced attacks, such advanced phishing and deepfake contents. Also, the lack of protective monitoring could take benefits from the efforts done in the area of software-defined networking, with the new capabilities offered by these networking environments in terms of programmability and flexibility.

Overall, the mapping with respect to Information Technology (IT) threats highlights more specifically, amongst the 12 ECSF role profiles from the ENISA skills framework, the following ones: the penetration tester, the cyber incident responder, the cybersecurity educator, the digital forensics investigator, and the chief information security officer.

 Table 3. The skills and knowledge required to effectively mitigate Information technology cybersecurity threats for the first set of the ECSF role profiles

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR-	CYBER INCIDENT	CYBER LEGAL, POLICY &	CYBER SECU-	CYBER THREAT IN-	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT
	MATION SECU-	RESPONDER	COMPLIANCE OFFICER	RITY AUDI-	TELLIGENCE SPECIAL-	
	RITY OFFICER			TOR	IST	
	(CISO)					
		INFC	DRMATION TECHNOLOGY THR	EATS		
AI (Artificial Intelligence)	Apply security	-	-	-	Collect, analyse and	-
and generative AI-enabled	design principles,				correlate cyber	
	e.g. least privi-				threat information	
	lege (weight: 3)				originating from mul-	
					tiple sources (weight:	
					3)	
Malware exploits	-	Protect a network	-	-	-	Monitor progress of issues
		against malware.				throughout lifecycle and
		(e.g., NIPS, anti-				communicate effectively
		malware, re-				(weight: 3)
		strict/prevent ex-				
		ternal devices,				
		(woight: 4)				
Bansomware			_		_	_
	-	-		-	-	-
Privacy Infringement	Implement cyber-	-	Enforce and advocate or-	-	-	-
	security recom-		ganisation's data privacy			
	mendations and		and protection program			
	best practices		(weight: 4)			
	(weight: 3)		explain and communicate			
			topics to stakeholders and			
			users (weight: A)			
Identity theft	Implement cyber-	-	Enforce and advocate or-		-	
	security recom-		ganisation's data privacy			
	mendations and		and protection program			
			(weight: 4)			

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR- MATION SECU-	CYBER INCIDENT RESPONDER	CYBER LEGAL, POLICY & COMPLIANCE OFFICER	CYBER SECU- RITY AUDI-	CYBER THREAT IN- TELLIGENCE SPECIAL-	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT
	RITY OFFICER			TOR	IST	
	(CISO)					
	1	INFC	DRMATION TECHNOLOGY THR	EATS	Γ	I
	best practices (weight: 3)					
Compromising of commu-	-	Secure network	-	-	-	-
nication equipment		(weight: 3)				
Web applications attack	-	-	-	-	-	Plan and implement applica- tion and data provisioning (weight: 3)
Vulnerabilities in Mobile	Communicate	Secure network	-	-	-	-
Applications and payment	and promote the	communications				
interfaces	risk analysis out-	(weight: 5)				
	comes and risk					
	management					
	(weight: 3)					
Data Confidentiality, In-	-	Secure network	Enforce and advocate or-	Follow and	Collect, analyse and	Dealing with problems
tegrity and Availability		communications	ganisation's data privacy	practice au-	correlate cyber	(weight: 3)
		(weight: 3)	(weight: 4.5)	diting frame-	originating from mul-	contribute to the develop-
			(weight: 4.0)	standards	tiple sources (weight:	icy, including ICT security
				and method-	3)	and quality (weight: 3)
				ologies		
Eavesdropping and traffic	-	Secure network	-	- (weight: 4)	-	-
analysis		communications				
		(weight: 4)				
DDoS	-	-	-	-	-	-
Social Engineering	Implement cyber-	-	-	-	-	-
	security					

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR-	CYBER INCIDENT	CYBER LEGAL, POLICY &	CYBER SECU-	CYBER THREAT IN-	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT
	MATION SECU-	RESPONDER	COMPLIANCE OFFICER	RITY AUDI-	TELLIGENCE SPECIAL-	
	RITY OFFICER			TOR	IST	
	(CISO)					
		INFC	DRMATION TECHNOLOGY THR	EATS		
	recommenda-					
	tions and best					
	practices (weight:					
	3)					
POS intrusions	Apply security	-	-	-	-	-
	design principles,					
	e.g. least privi-					
	lege (weight: 3)					
Miscellaneous errors	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lack of protective moni-	-	Collect, analyse	-	-	-	Contribute to the develop-
toring		and correlate				ment of ICT strategy and pol-
		cyber threat infor-				icy, including ICT security
		mation originat-				and quality (weight: 2.5)
		ing from multiple				
		sources (weight:				
		3.5)				
Vulnerabilities in auto-	Apply security	-	-	-	Collect, analyse and	-
mated machines (ATMs,	design principles,				correlate cyber	
cashier machines, POS in-	e.g. least privi-				threat information	
trusions)	lege (weight: 4)				originating from mul-	
					tiple sources (weight:	
					3)	
Large-scale attacks on IoT	Apply security	-	-	-	-	-
(medical devices)	design principles,					
	e.g. least privi-					
	lege (weight: 2.5)					
Advanced Persistent	-	Recognize and		-	-	Dealing with problems
Threats (APT)		categorize types				(weight: 2.5)
		of vulnerabilities				

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR- MATION SECU- RITY OFFICER (CISO)	CYBER INCIDENT RESPONDER	CYBER LEGAL, POLICY & COMPLIANCE OFFICER	CYBER SECU- RITY AUDI- TOR	CYBER THREAT IN- TELLIGENCE SPECIAL- IST	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT
		INFO	DRMATION TECHNOLOGY THR	EATS		
		and associated at- tacks (weight: 3)				
Intellectual property theft	Communicate and promote the organisation's risk analysis out- comes and risk management processes (weight: 3)		Lead the development of appropriate cybersecurity and privacy policies and procedures that comple- ment the business needs and legal requirements; further ensure its ac- ceptance, comprehension and implementation and communicate it between the involved parties (weight: 4) Perform (Implement) and Monitor audits against cy- bersecurity-related applica- ble laws, regulations and standards, collect needed evidence and document audit information and re- sults, in alignment to the relevant audit plan(s). (weight: 2)		-	
Denial of Service (Dos)	-	-	-	-	-	Conduct performance and resilience testing (weight: 4) Contribute to the develop- ment of ICT strategy and pol- icy, including ICT security and guality (weight: 3)

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR- MATION SECU- RITY OFFICER (CISO)	CYBER INCIDENT RESPONDER	CYBER LEGAL, POLICY & COMPLIANCE OFFICER	CYBER SECU- RITY AUDI- TOR	CYBER THREAT IN- TELLIGENCE SPECIAL- IST	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT
		INFO	ORMATION TECHNOLOGY THE	REATS		
DNS Cache Poisoning	-	-	-	-	-	-
DNS Spoofing	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cybersquatting	-	-	-	-	-	-
Typosquatting	-	-	-	-	-	-
Adapting to risks from ad- vances in employee com- puting technologies (e.g., increased prevalence of sensors, Al, etc.)	-	-	Lead the development of appropriate cybersecurity and privacy policies and procedures that comple- ment the business needs and legal requirements; further ensure its ac- ceptance, comprehension and implementation and communicate it between the involved parties (weight: 4)	Apply audit- ing tools and techniques (weight: 3)	-	-
Injection flaws	-	-	-	-	-	-
Broken authentication	-	Secure network communications (weight: 3.5)	-	-	-	Plan and implement applica- tion and data provisioning (weight: 2.5)
Broken access control	Apply security design principles, e.g. least privi- lege (weight: 2.5)	Secure network communications (weight: 4)	-	-	-	-
Cross-site scripting (XSS)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Man-in-the-middle attacks	-	Secure network communications (weight: 4)	-	-	-	-

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR- MATION SECU- RITY OFFICER (CISO)	CYBER INCIDENT RESPONDER	CYBER LEGAL, POLICY & COMPLIANCE OFFICER	CYBER SECU- RITY AUDI- TOR	CYBER THREAT IN- TELLIGENCE SPECIAL- IST	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT			
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY THREATS									
XML external entities (XXE)	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Cryptojacking	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Watering hole	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Living off the land (LOTL)	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Insecure deserialization	-	-	-	-	Collect, analyse and correlate cyber threat information originating from mul- tiple sources (weight: 3.5)	-			

 Table 4. The skills and knowledge required to effectively mitigate Information technology cybersecurity threats for the second set of the ECSF role profiles

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY RE-	CYBERSECURITY	DIGITAL FORENSICS IN-	PENETRATION TESTER				
	EDUCATOR	IMPLEMENTER	SEARCHER	RISK MANAGER	VESTIGATOR					
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY THREATS										
AI and generative AI-enabled	-	-	-		-	-				
Malware exploits	-	-	-	-	-	Conduct ethical hacking (weight: 4) Identify and solve cyberse- curity-related issues (weight: 3.5)				
Ransomware	-	-	-	-	Use specific tools, tech- niques and methods in re- lation to digital forensics (extracting, reversing and understanding code and traces, logs, malware anal- ysis, protocols, operating systems, etc) (weight: 3)	-				
Privacy Infringement	Monitor evolving security and pri- vacy infrastruc- tures, technologies and methods (weight: 4)	-	Decompose and an- alyse systems to de- velop security and privacy require- ments (weight: 3)	Enable business assets owners, ex- ecutives and other stakeholders to make risk in- formed decisions to manage and mitigate risks (weight: 3.5)	Use specific tools, tech- niques and methods in re- lation to digital forensics (extracting, reversing and understanding code and traces, logs, malware anal- ysis, protocols, operating systems, etc) (weight: 3)	-				
Identity theft	Monitor evolving security and pri- vacy infrastruc- tures, technologies	-	Decompose and an- alyse systems to de- velop security and	Enable business assets owners, ex- ecutives and other stakeholders to	-	-				

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY RE-	CYBERSECURITY	DIGITAL FORENSICS IN-	PENETRATION TESTER				
	EDUCATOR	IMPLEMENTER	SEARCHER	RISK MANAGER	VESTIGATOR					
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY THREATS										
	and methods		privacy require-	make risk in-						
	(weight: 4)		ments (weight: 3)	formed decisions						
				to manage and						
				mitigate risks						
				(weight: 3.5)						
Compromising of	-	-	-	-	Use specific tools, tech-	Conduct ethical hacking				
communication					niques and methods in re-	(weight: 4)				
equipment					lation to digital forensics	Identify and solve cyberse-				
					(extracting, reversing and	curity-related issues				
					understanding code and	(weight: 4)				
					traces, logs, malware anal-					
					ysis, protocols, operating					
					systems, etc) (weight: 4)					
Web applications at-	-	-	-	-	Use specific tools, tech-	Conduct ethical hacking				
tack					niques and methods in re-	(weight: 4)				
					lation to digital forensics	Identify and solve cyberse-				
					(extracting, reversing and	curity-related issues				
					understanding code and	(weight: 4)				
					traces, logs, malware anal-					
					ysis, protocols, operating					
					systems, etc) (weight: 4)					
Vulnerabilities in	-	-	-	-	Use specific tools, tech-	Conduct ethical hacking				
Mobile Applications					niques and methods in re-	(weight:3)				
and payment inter-					lation to digital forensics	Identify and solve cyberse-				
faces					(extracting, reversing and	curity-related issues				
					understanding code and	(weight: 3)				
					traces, logs, malware anal-	Assess cybersecurity vul-				
					ysis, protocols, operating	nerabilities (weight: 4)				
					systems, etc) (weight:3)					
Data Confidentiality,	Monitor evolving	-	Decompose and an-	-	-	-				
Integrity and Availa-	security and pri-		alyse systems to de-							
bility	vacy		velop security and							

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY RE-	CYBERSECURITY	DIGITAL FORENSICS IN-	PENETRATION TESTER				
	EDUCATOR	IMPLEMENTER	SEARCHER	RISK MANAGER	VESTIGATOR					
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY THREATS										
	infrastructures,		privacy require-							
	technologies and		ments and identify							
	methods (weight:		effective solution							
	4)		(weight: 3)							
Eavesdropping and	-	-	-	-	-	Develop codes, scripts and				
traffic analysis						programmes (weight: 2)				
DDoS	Apply network	-	-	-	-	-				
	protection compo-									
	nents and security									
	controls (weight:									
	4)									
Social Engineering	Apply network	-	-	-	-	Perform social engineering				
	protection compo-					(weight: 4)				
	nents and security									
	controls (weight:									
	2.5)									
POS intrusions	Apply network	-	-	-	Work ethically and inde-	Conduct ethical hacking				
	protection compo-				pendently; not influenced	(weight: 4)				
	nents and security				and biased by internal or	Identify and solve cyberse-				
	controls (weight:				external actors (weight: 4)	curity-related issues				
	3)					(weight: 4)				
Miscellaneous er-	-	-	Identify effective so-	-	-	-				
rors			lutions (weight: 3)							
Lack of protective	-	-	-	-	-	-				
monitoring										
Vulnerabilities in au-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
tomated machines										
(ATMs, cashier ma-										
chines, POS intru-										
sions)										

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY RE-	CYBERSECURITY	DIGITAL FORENSICS IN-	PENETRATION TESTER
	EDUCATOR	IMPLEMENTER	SEARCHER	RISK MANAGER	VESTIGATOR	
		I	NFORMATION TECHNO	LOGY THREATS		
Large-scale attacks	-	-	-	-	-	-
on IoT (medical de-						
vices)						
Advanced Persistent	-	-	-	-	-	-
Threats (APT)						
Intellectual property theft	Monitor evolving security and pri- vacy infrastruc- tures, technologies and methods (weight: 3)	-	Decompose and an- alyse systems to de- velop security and privacy require- ments (weight: 4)	-	-	-
Denial of Service (Dos)	Apply network protection compo- nents and security controls (weight: 3)	Conduct network configuration and setup (weight: 3)	-	-	Use specific tools, tech- niques and methods in re- lation to digital forensics (extracting, reversing and understanding code and traces, logs, malware anal- ysis, protocols, operating systems, etc) (weight: 2.5)	Conduct ethical hacking (weight: 3) Identify and solve cyberse- curity-related issues (weight: 4)
DNS Cache Poison- ing	Apply network protection compo- nents and security controls (weight: 3)	Conduct network configuration and setup (weight: 3)	-	-	Use specific tools, tech- niques and methods in re- lation to digital forensics (extracting, reversing and understanding code and traces, logs, malware anal- ysis, protocols, operating systems, etc) (weight: 3)	Conduct ethical hacking (weight: 4) Identify and solve cyberse- curity-related issues (weight: 3.5)
DNS Spoofing	Apply network protection compo- nents and security controls (weight: 3)	-	-	-	Use specific tools, tech- niques and methods in re- lation to digital forensics (extracting, reversing and understanding code and	Conduct ethical hacking (weight: 3) Identify and solve cyberse- curity-related issues (weight: 4)

Identified threats **CYBERSECURITY CYBERSECURITY CYBERSECURITY RE-CYBERSECURITY DIGITAL FORENSICS IN-**PENETRATION TESTER EDUCATOR IMPLEMENTER SEARCHER **RISK MANAGER** VESTIGATOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY THREATS traces, logs, malware analysis, protocols, operating systems, etc) (weight: 2.5) Cybersquatting Conduct ethical hacking _ _ _ (weight: 3) Identify and solve cybersecurity-related issues (weight: 4) Conduct ethical hacking Typosquatting -_ _ _ (weight: 3) Identify and solve cybersecurity-related issues (weight: 4) Conduct ethical hacking Adapting to risks Use monitoring from advances in tools to measure (weight: 3) Identify and solve cyberseemployee compuand evaluate the curity-related issues ting technologies effectiveness of (weight: 4) implemented cybersecurity controls and the achieved security levels. (weight: 3.5) Conduct ethical hacking **Injection flaws** _ (weight: 3) Identify and solve cybersecurity-related issues (weight: 4) Conduct ethical hacking Broken authentica---_ -(weight: 3) tion Identify and solve

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY RE-	CYBERSECURITY	DIGITAL FORENSICS IN-	PENETRATION TESTER
	EDUCATOR	IMPLEMENTER	SEARCHER	RISK MANAGER	VESTIGATOR	
		I	INFORMATION TECHNO	LOGY THREATS		
						cybersecurity-related issues
						(weight: 4)
Broken access con-	-	Conduct network	-	-	-	Conduct ethical hacking
trol		configuration and				(weight: 4)
		setup (weight: 3)				Identify and solve cyberse-
						curity-related issues
						(weight: 4)
Cross-site scripting	-	-	-	-	-	Conduct ethical hacking
(XSS)						(weight: 3)
						Identify and solve cyberse-
						curity-related issues
						(weight: 4)
Man-in-the-middle	-	Conduct network	-	-	-	-
аттаскя		configuration and				
		setup (weight: 3)				Conduct athical healting
tion (VVE)	-	-	-	-	-	(woight: 2)
ties (AAE)						(weight, 5)
						curity related issues
						(weight: 1)
Cryptojacking						Decompose and analyse
Ciyptojacking						systems to identify weak-
						nesses and ineffective con-
						trols (weight: 3)
						Conduct ethical backing
						(weight: 3)
Watering hole	-	-	-	-	-	Decompose and analyse
						systems to identify weak-
						nesses and ineffective con-
						trols (weight: 3)
						Conduct ethical hacking
						(weight: 3)

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY EDUCATOR	CYBERSECURITY IMPLEMENTER	CYBERSECURITY RE- SEARCHER	CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGER	DIGITAL FORENSICS IN- VESTIGATOR	PENETRATION TESTER			
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY THREATS									
Living off the land (LOTL)	-	-	-	-	-	Decompose and analyse systems to identify weak- nesses and ineffective con- trols (weight: 3) Conduct ethical hacking (weight: 3)			
Insecure deserializa- tion	-	-	-	-	-	Conduct ethical hacking (weight: 3) Identify and solve cyberse- curity-related issues (weight: 4)			

5.2.3. Shared Information Technology Threats

Tables 10 and 11 offer a detailed mapping between Shared-IT threats ECSF role profiles. Within each table cell, a compilation of skills attributed to a specific job profile is provided, illustrating how these skills can be effectively employed to address and mitigate the Shared-IT security threats at hand.

The mapping of skills with respect to Shared IT threats also highlights several major skills from the ENISA cybersecurity skills framework. In particular, following and practicing auditing frameworks, standards and methodologies are essential for ensuring the enforcement of the security policy and maintaining secure and resilient infrastructures. This is required to properly address several cybersecurity threats, such as those affecting the supply chain or related to insider attacks. Collecting, analysing and correlating cyber threat information originating from multiple sources is also critical to address the lack of information sharing as well as deficiencies that may exist incident reporting activities. It may also address threats regarding third-party attacks or preventing some breakdown due to cybersecurity attacks. Coordinating the integration of security solutions is also a key requirement to guarantee the seamless integration of prevention, detection and mitigation methods and techniques used in an organization and minimise network infrastructures' attack surface. Educating, monitoring and assessing the awareness of organization members and external parties on cybersecurity and privacy issues is another important factor contributing to preventing low awareness with respect to security risks, and threats regarding compromised confidential or personal data. Analyzing and consolidating an organization's quality and risk management practices is another factor contributing to addressing threats with respect to resilience. These threats should also be addressed by regularly conducting performance and resilience test, to quantify an organisation's capabilities (technical and non-technical) to resist against successful attacks.

The analysis of this third mapping shows a relatively high coverage, with more than 80% of the shared Information Technology threats that are covered by at least two skills from the REWIRE skill framework. Again, some of the considered skills could be refined with respect to the specificities of cybersecurity threats. For instance, the threat regarding falsified and stolen medical data may require some refinements about medical information systems and their security, but also more generally about specific healthcare regulations. This contributes to a better handling of risks related to data falsification and data theft in a medical context. In the same manner, the threats regarding geopolitical instability risk could involve further specific skills with respect to monitoring and analysing geopolitical events, complying with international cybersecurity regulations, and even engaging in cyber diplomacy to mitigate inherent risks.

Overall, this mapping with respect to shared Information Technology threats highlights more specifically, amongst the 12 role profiles from the REWIRE skills framework, the following ones: the chief information security officer, the cyber threat intelligence specialist, the cyber-security implementer, the cybersecurity auditor, and the cybersecurity implementer.



Table 5. The skills and knowledge required to effectively mitigate Shared-IT threats for the first set of the ECSF role profiles

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR-	CYBER INCIDENT	CYBER LEGAL, POLICY &	CYBER SECU-	CYBER THREAT	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT
	MATION SECURITY	RESPONDER	COMPLIANCE OFFICER	RITY AUDI-	INTELLIGENCE	
	OFFICER (CISO)			TOR	SPECIALIST	
			Shared-IT threats			
Politically motivated at-	-	Recognize and	-	Assess risk	Collect, analyse	-
tacks or hacktivism		categorize types		factors	and correlate	
		of vulnerabilities		(weight: 4)	cyber threat in-	
		and associated			formation origi-	
		attacks (weight:			nating from	
		4)			multiple sources	
					(weight: 4)	
Unpatched & outdated	-	-	-	-	-	Coordinate the integration of
software						security solutions (weight: 3)
						Monitor progress of issues
						throughout lifecycle and com-
						municate effectively (weight:
						3)
Low awareness	-	-	Educate, monitor and assess	-	-	-
			the awareness of organiza-			
			tion members and external			
			parties on cybersecurity and			
			privacy issues as needed.			
			(weight: 4)			
Lack of incident reporting	-	Manage and ana-	-	-	-	-
		lyse log files				
		(weight: 3)				
		Collect, analyse				
		and correlate				
		cyber threat in-				
		formation origi-				
		nating from				

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR-	CYBER INCIDENT	CYBER LEGAL, POLICY &	CYBER SECU-	CYBER THREAT	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT
	MATION SECURITY	RESPONDER	COMPLIANCE OFFICER	RITY AUDI-	INTELLIGENCE	
	OFFICER (CISO)			TOR	SPECIALIST	
			Shared-IT threats			
		multiple sources				
		(weight: 3)				
Lack of information sharing	-	Manage and ana-	-	-	-	-
		lyse log files				
		(weight: 3)				
		Collect, analyse				
		and correlate				
		cyber threat in-				
		formation origi-				
		nating from mul-				
		tiple sources				
		(weight: 3)				
Insider threats	Communicate and	-	-	-	-	-
	promote the or-					
	ganisation's risk					
	analysis outcomes					
	and risk manage-					
	ment processes					
	(weight: 4)					
Risks of emerging technol-	Assist in communi-	-	Perform (Implement) and	Assess risk	-	Coordinate the integration of
ogies like blockchain, AI,	cation of the enter-		Monitor audits against cy-	factors		security solutions (weight: 3)
VR, quantum computing,	prise architecture		bersecurity-related applica-	(weight: 4)		
intelligent automation, etc	and standards,		ble laws, regulations and			
	principles and ob-		standards, collect needed			
	jectives to the ap-		evidence and document au-			
	plication teams		dit information and results,			
	(weight: 4)		in alignment to the relevant			
	Analyse and imple-		audit plan(s). (weight: 4)			
	ment cybersecurity					
	policies, certifica-					
	tions, standards,					

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR-	CYBER INCIDENT	CYBER LEGAL, POLICY &	CYBER SECU-	CYBER THREAT	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT			
	MATION SECURITY	RESPONDER	COMPLIANCE OFFICER	RITY AUDI-	INTELLIGENCE				
	OFFICER (CISO)			TOR	SPECIALIST				
Shared-IT threats									
	methodologies and								
	frameworks								
	(weight: 4)								
Keeping up with changing	Assist in communi-	-	Perform (Implement) and	Follow and	-	-			
regulatory requirements	cation of the enter-		Monitor audits against cy-	practice au-					
(e.g. GPDR, AI regulations,	prise architecture		bersecurity-related applica-	diting frame-					
breach disclosure require-	and standards,		ble laws, regulations and	works, stand-					
ments etc.), or their inef-	principles and ob-		standards, collect needed	ards and					
fectiveness	jectives to the ap-		evidence and document au-	methodolo-					
	plication teams		dit information and results,	gies (weight:					
	(weight: 3)		in alignment to the relevant	4)					
	Analyse and imple-		audit plan(s). (weight: 4)	Assess risk					
	ment cybersecurity			factors					
	policies, certifica-			(weight: 3)					
	tions, standards,								
	methodologies and								
	frameworks								
	(weight: 4)								
Misinformation and disin-	Analyse and imple-	Recognize and	-	Follow and	Collect, analyse	-			
formation sowing confu-	ment cybersecurity	categorize types		practice au-	and correlate				
sion among executives and	policies, certifica-	of vulnerabilities		diting frame-	cyber threat in-				
the board about cyber risks	tions, standards,	and associated		works, stand-	formation origi-				
	methodologies and	attacks (weight:		ards and	nating from				
	frameworks	3)		methodolo-	multiple sources				
	(weight: 4)			gies (weight:	(weight: 4)				
				3)					
Security misconfiguration	Apply security de-	-	-	-	-	-			
	sign principles, e.g.								
	least privilege								
	(weight: 4)								

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR-	CYBER INCIDENT	CYBER LEGAL, POLICY &	CYBER SECU-	CYBER THREAT	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT			
	MATION SECURITY	RESPONDER	COMPLIANCE OFFICER	RITY AUDI-	INTELLIGENCE				
	OFFICER (CISO)			TOR	SPECIALIST				
Shared-IT threats									
Third party related attacks	Implement cyber-	-	-	-	Collect, analyse	-			
	security recom-				and correlate				
	mendations and				cyber threat in-				
	best practices				formation origi-				
	(weight: 4)				nating from				
					multiple sources				
					(weight: 4)				
					Automate				
					threat intelli-				
					gence manage-				
					ment proce-				
					dures (weight:				
					3)				
Infrastructure breakdown		Work on operat-	-	Follow and	Automate threat	Conduct performance and re-			
due to cyberattack		ing systems, serv-		practice au-	intelligence	silience testing (weight: 4)			
		ers, clouds and		diting frame-	management				
		relevant infra-		works, stand-	procedures				
		structures		ards and	(weight: 3)				
		(weight: 4)		methodolo-					
				gies (weight:					
				3)					
				Assess risk					
				factors					
				(weight: 4)					
Geopolitical instability risk	Apply security de-	Collect, analyse	-	Follow and	-	-			
	sign principles, e.g.	and correlate		practice au-					
	least privilege	cyber threat in-		diting frame-					
	(weight: 4)	formation origi-		works, stand-					
		nating from mul-		ards and					
		tiple sources							
		(weight: 4)							

Identified threats	CHIEF INFOR-	CYBER INCIDENT	CYBER LEGAL, POLICY &	CYBER SECU-	CYBER THREAT	CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECT		
	MATION SECURITY	RESPONDER	COMPLIANCE OFFICER	RITY AUDI-	INTELLIGENCE			
	OFFICER (CISO)			TOR	SPECIALIST			
Shared-IT threats								
				methodolo- gies (weight: 3)				
Supply-chain resilience	Apply security de- sign principles, e.g. least privilege (weight: 4)	Work on operat- ing systems, serv- ers, clouds and relevant infra- structures (weight: 2.5)	Perform (Implement) and Monitor audits against cy- bersecurity-related applica- ble laws, regulations and standards, collect needed evidence and document au- dit information and results, in alignment to the relevant audit plan(s). (weight: 4)	Assess risk factors (weight: 4)	Use and apply CTI platforms and tools (weight: 3)	Conduct performance and re- silience testing (weight: 4.5)		
Blackmail due to compro- mised personal data	-	-	Educate, monitor and assess the awareness of organiza- tion members and external parties on cybersecurity and privacy issues as needed. (weight: 3) Enforce and advocate or- ganisation's data privacy and protection program (weight: 4)		Coordinate the integration of security solu- tions (weight: 3)	-		
Falsified or stolen medical data	-	-		Follow and practice au- diting frame- works, stand- ards and methodolo- gies (weight: 3)	Collect, analyse and correlate cyber threat in- formation origi- nating from multiple sources (weight: 4)	-		

Table 6. The skills and knowledge required to effectively mitigate Shared-IT threats for the second set of the ECSF role profiles

Identified	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY	CYBERSECURITY	DIGITAL FO-	PENETRATION TESTER
threats	EDUCATOR	IMPLEMENTER	RESEARCHER	RISK MANAGER	RENSICS IN- VESTIGATOR	
	·	·	Shared	IT threats		
Politically moti- vated attacks or hacktivism	-	-	-	Communicate, pre- sent and report to relevant stake- holders (weight: 4)	-	Perform social engineering (weight: 3)
Unpatched & outdated soft- ware	-	Develop code, scripts and pro- grammes (weight: 4)	-	-	-	Develop code, scripts and programmes (weight: 4)
Low awareness	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lack of incident reporting	-	Communicate, pre- sent and report to relevant stakehold- ers (weight: 4)	-	Communicate, pre- sent and report to relevant stake- holders (weight: 4)	Collect infor- mation while preserving its integrity (weight: 4) Strictly and systematically follow the pre- scribed proce- dures. (weight: 3)	-
Lack of infor- mation sharing	-	Communicate, pre- sent and report to relevant stakehold- ers (weight: 4)	-	Communicate, pre- sent and report to relevant stake- holders (weight: 4)	Collect infor- mation while preserving its integrity (weight: 4) Strictly and systematically follow the	-

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY EDUCATOR	CYBERSECURITY IMPLEMENTER	CYBERSECURITY RESEARCHER	CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGER	DIGITAL FO- RENSICS IN-	PENETRATION TESTER
			Shared	IT threats	VESTIGATOR	
					prescribed pro- cedures. (weight: 3)	
Insider threats	Monitor evolving security and pri- vacy infrastruc- tures, technologies and methods (weight: 4)	Performs basic risk assessments for small information systems. (weight: 3)	-	Build a cybersecu- rity risk-aware en- vironment (weight: 4)	Work ethically and inde- pendently; not influenced and biased by inter- nal or external actors (weight: 4)	-
Risks of emerg- ing technologies like blockchain, AI, VR, quantum computing, intel- ligent automa- tion, etc	-	Assess the security and performance of solutions (weight: 3)	-	Build a cybersecu- rity risk-aware en- vironment (weight: 4)	-	-
Keeping up with changing regula- tory require- ments (e.g. GPDR, AI regula- tions, breach dis- closure require- ments etc.), or their ineffective- ness	-		-	-	-	-
Misinformation and disinfor- mation sowing	-	-	-	Identify sources of information that can be used for	-	-

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY EDUCATOR	CYBERSECURITY IMPLEMENTER	CYBERSECURITY RESEARCHER	CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGER	DIGITAL FO- RENSICS IN- VESTIGATOR	PENETRATION TESTER
			Shared	IT threats		
confusion among executives and the board about cyber risks Security miscon- figuration	-	Conduct network configuration and setup (weight: 3)	-	monitoring and measurement of cybersecurity con- trols. (weight: 2.5) -	-	Decompose and analyse systems to identify weaknesses and ineffective controls (weight: 4) Identify and solve cybersecurity-related is- sues (weight: 4)
Third party re- lated attacks	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure breakdown due to cyberattack	-	Contribute to the identification of risks that arise from potential technical solution architectures. (weight: 3) Suggest alternate solutions or coun- termeasures to mitigate risks. (weight: 3) Define secure sys- tems configura- tions in compliance with intended ar- chitectures (weight: 4)	Decompose and analyse systems to develop security and privacy re- quirements and identify effective solutions (weight: 3)	Oversee and con- trol the implemen- tation of preven- tion, security, and surveillance measures in order to assess their ef- fectiveness and to make adjustments in case of unsatis- factory results. (weight: 4)	-	Decompose and analyse systems to identify weaknesses and ineffective controls (weight: 4)
Geopolitical in- stability risk	-	-	-	Analyse and con- solidate	Recognize and categorize	Assess cybersecurity vulnerabilities (weight: 3)

Identified threats	CYBERSECURITY EDUCATOR	CYBERSECURITY IMPLEMENTER	CYBERSECURITY RESEARCHER	CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGER	DIGITAL FO- RENSICS IN- VESTIGATOR	PENETRATION TESTER
			Shared	IT threats		·
				organisation's quality and risk management prac- tices (weight: 3)	types of vulner- abilities and as- sociated at- tacks (weight: 3)	
Supply-chain re- silience	-	-	-	Analyse and con- solidate organisa- tion's quality and risk management practices (weight: 3.5)	-	Assess cybersecurity vulnerabilities (weight: 3)
Blackmail due to compromised personal data	-	-	-	-	-	Identify and solve cybersecurity-related is- sues (weight: 3)
Falsified or sto- len medical data	Monitor evolving security and pri- vacy infrastruc- tures, technologies and methods (weight: 3)		Decompose and analyse systems to develop security and privacy re- quirements and identify effective solutions (weight: 3)			

To sum up, this chapter has systematically aligned the predominant cybersecurity threats with the requisite skills delineated across the 12 ECSF role profiles. This mapping not only clarifies the direct relationships between emerging threats and the specific skill sets needed to counteract them but also reinforces the strategic importance of continuous skills development in the cybersecurity domain. The insights generated from this analysis are crucial for developing a proactive and resilient cybersecurity workforce, capable of adapting to the rapidly evolving digital threat landscape.

The REWIRE project has identified key cybersecurity threats and the skills needed to counter them. To close the cyber-skills gap, we've developed targeted training courses as part of our WP4 activities. These include Network Penetration Testing, Web Penetration Testing and Cyber-threat intelligence specialist, all directly aligned with the vulnerabilities discussed in this report. For example, our Network Penetration Testing course teaches professionals how to find and fix vulnerabilities in CMS platforms like WordPress and Drupal, addressing issues like DDoS attacks and outdated software. We also use the Social Engineering Toolkit (SET) to give hands-on experience in recognizing and defending against social engineering attacks, a growing concern in cybersecurity. Our Web Penetration Testing course focuses on preventing database breaches by teaching how to detect and guard against this serious web application vulnerability. Similarly, the Web Penetration Testing course covers essential areas like Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and broken authentication, tackling common web security flaws head-on. The Cyber Threat Intelligence Specialist course addresses critical aspects of data privacy and securing sensitive information. It provides training on identifying, analyzing, and responding to cyber threats, with a strong focus on safeguarding data integrity and confidentiality. To improve information sharing, we've developed the CyberABILITY platform, a hub for sharing educational resources and best practices among cybersecurity professionals. By connecting these courses and tools to the specific threats identified, we ensure our training provides the practical skills needed to handle real-world cybersecurity challenges.

CONCLUSIONS

The comprehensive analysis of job ads using the Job Ads Analyzer, in conjunction with the cybersecurity threat reports and the skills required to address them, presents a clear picture of the current cybersecurity job market and its alignment with the prevailing cyber threats. The ENISA report underscores the persistent nature of certain cyber threats such as ransomware, malware, social engineering, and supply-chain attacks. The job market analysis through the Job Ads Analyzer indicates that there is a significant demand for a wide range of skills to counter these threats.

The job ads reflect the demand for roles that can address the specific threats identified in the ENISA report. High-demand roles such as *Cybersecurity Implementer*, *Cybersecurity Architect*, and *Incident Responder*, *Chief Information Security Officer* and *Cybersecurity risk manager* indicate a market leaning towards operational and architectural expertise, which aligns with the need to develop robust defences against complex cybersecurity challenges. The number of job ads for each role provides an indication of the market's valuation of the skills necessary to address specific threats, and subsequently, where training and development efforts may be beneficial.

From the skills perspective, the cybersecurity job market is currently emphasizing a diverse range of skills that include both technical expertise and soft skills. Leading the demand is the ability to 'Collaborate and Communicate,' underscoring the importance of interpersonal skills in managing and conveying complex cybersecurity issues effectively across various stakeholders. Technical skills related to 'Information Systems and Network Security' and 'Information Security Controls Assessment' are also highly sought after, reflecting the need for professionals who can secure networks and assess as well as implement security controls.

In conclusion, the findings suggest that the cybersecurity job market is closely aligned with the current threat environment, emphasizing the need for professionals who are not only technically proficient but also adept in communication and strategic planning. The REWIRE project's focus on developing curricula and certifications for specific roles will address these needs, aiming to provide a better understanding of the situation in the cybersecurity skills market and enhance the workforce's ability to effectively respond to cyber threats.



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